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The objective of the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is to correct both 
vertical imbalances and horizontal inequalities in the distribution of federal resources. The 
vertical imbalance arises due to the asymmetric assignment of functional responsibilities 
and financial powers between different levels of governments, while horizontal 
inequalities are the existing disparities in the revenue capacity across the constituent 
units of  the federation.  The extent of these imbalances a re different across different 
federations and so also the design of transfers. In  India, institutional mechanism of 
federal transfers revolves around three institutions, viz., Finance Commission, Planning 
Commission and various ministries of the  Central (Federal)  Government.  With the 
evolution of the system of transfers over the years, however, a large part of the transfer 
of resources has fallen outside the ambit of  the  Finance Commission. T he Planning 
Commission transfers in the form of plan grants and discretionary transfers in the form of 
centrally sponsored schemes (hereafter CSS) have become important.  By  their very 




As increasing proportion of resources transferred to the states  have  stayed 
outside the ambit of statutory transfers recommended by the Finance Commission, the 
system of transfer as evolved over the years is said to have introduced an element of ad-
hoc-ism and arbitrariness. In case of Finance Commission transfers also, it increasingly 
became skewed towards tax devolution, which by nature is an  entitlement  for all the 
states. Increasing share of tax devolution in total transfers through Finance Commission 
in turn has left little scope for fiscal equalisation grants to play its role in equalising fiscal 
capacities across states. The Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) has emphasised the 
need for a greater role of equalisation grants in the present scheme of transfers to correct 
for  cost disabilities and redistributive consideration that are not adequately addressed 
through tax devolution.
2    
 
In recent years, t he  central government has  also  been spending  directly  on 
various services which are primarily in the functional domain of the states such as health, 
education and rural development.
3 Although direct central spending are  technically not 
transfers, they have a significant impact in equalising the quality of public service delivery 
across states.  For example, in a state where education expenditure is low and if the 
state is lagging behind in the educational attainment compared to the rest of the country, 
                                                 
1 Our estimates show that for the year 2006-07, the share of discretionary grants in total grants is 
as high as 48.42 percent. This does not the include grants going to the implementing agencies 
bypassing the state budget. 
2 The share of grants recommended by TFC for the period between 2005-06 and 2009-10  is 18.87 
percent of the total Finance Commission transfers which is substantially larger than the share of 
grants recommended by the earlier Finance Commissions (TFC Report: P-5) 
3 The share of central spending on these three categories of expenditures has increased from 
30.83 percent in 2000-01 to 41.9 percent in 2006-07 and further to 46.3 percent in 2007-08.   7 
direct central spending on education in this particular state is one method of bringing 
equalisation in the provision of education services. Other methods could be grants to the 
states, which could be tied or untied to overcome the cost and fiscal disabilities so that 
individual states are able to provide comparable levels of public services. Offsetting fiscal 
disabilities through direct central spending over the years have become an important 
policy tool in India, which is reflected in the proliferation of various centrally sponsored 
schemes and also direct spending on various social and economic services by the central 
government. As noted above, these are in the overlapping functional jurisdictions of 
centre and states or exclusively in the functional domain of the states in India.  
 
 Rao (1997) examined the nature of non-transparent intergovernmental transfers 
and its role in offsetting fiscal disabilities across states. Our study examines the impact of 
direct spending by the central government across states and its impact on fiscal 
equalisation. This also brings to light the distribution of central expenditures at the state 
level and in turn enables us to comment on the policy of regional expenditure distribution 
by the central government.  
 
No empirical work  thus far  has examined the spatial distribution of  central 
expenditure (transfers plus direct spending) at state level in India
4 and their impact in 
bringing fiscal equalisation. Also, despite the growing intervention of central government 
in the state subjects in the recent years, there is very little understanding of the pattern of 
central government expenditure at state level. A few questions firm up at the outset. What 
is the level and pattern of central government expenditure to the states and its 
distribution? What is the net effect of these public expenditures at the state level? Have 
these central transfers and direct central spending led to fiscal equalisation or  have 
conflicted in the goal of achieving horizontal equity?  We try to address these issues by 
analysing the interstate distribution of public expenditure by the central government. 
 
The challenges of undertaking such an analysis are many. The most formidable 
obstacle is the complete absence of statewise data on direct central expenditure except 
for grants given to the states. The other major constraint is that all central expenditures 
cannot be spatially partitioned. Also,  one has to be extremely careful in doing such 
analysis since the spatial apportioning of certain categories of expenditures may not be 
relevant or even appropriate. F or example, defence  and other  expenditure that has 
economy wide implications needs to be excluded from spatial portioning across states 
even if the government spending is in a specific geographical location. In this study, we 
concentrate on those types of e xpenditure which can be spatially  distributed  without 
violating the principles defined above and also fall in the functional domain of the states 
or in the overlapping functional jurisdictions. For the purpose of our study, we term these 
direct expenditures of the central government as quasi fiscal transfers.    
                                                 
4 Existing studies are heavily skewed to the analysis of spatial inequality and fiscal transfers at the 
aggregate level, leaving behind the incidence of direct  spending by  central government to the 
states and below-state levels largely unexplored. Empirical studies are also rich in fiscal transfers 
related issues, though whether transfers are fiscally equalising is rarely attempted in Indian context. 
With regard to direct spending of central government to states, a few studies attempted micro level 
‘expenditure tracking analysis’ of selected centrally sponsored schemes in selected states through 
primary surveys. At below state level, studies have conducted on the impact of grants on local 
expenditure. The benefit incidence analysis (BIA) of public expenditure across poor and non-poor 
has also been attempted by a few authors (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1998). At the global level, a few 
studies have estimated the incidence of central expenditure across provinces, mainly in terms of 
household fiscal transfers, which is absent in the context of India.   8 
II.  Conceptual Framework 
 
 
An important guiding principle in allocating financial resources in a federal 
system is to enable the states to provide comparable levels of  public  services at 
comparable tax effort.  When the states are at different levels of fiscal capacity, they can 
incur comparable levels of expenditures on social and physical infrastructure only when 
central transfers offset the fiscal disability of states with low fiscal capacity. This makes 
the issue of designing a transfer system critically important. Despite fiscal transfers driven 
by various progressivity criteria recommended by successive Finance Commissions, the 
expenditure inequality across states has increased  and more  sharply in recent years
5 
(Rao, Singh, 2005; Bagchi, 2003;  Bagchi & Chakraborty, 2005).  Low resource base 
coupled with the inability of the transfer system to offset the low taxable capacity poorer 
states have resulted in low per-capita expenditures on basic social and economic 
services.  One of the main reasons for the increase in fiscal inequality is attributed to the 
multiple channels of transfers. It has often been argued that the equalising effects of the 
Finance Commission transfers often get offset by the channels of transfers which are 
discretionary, be  it  plan transfers outside normal  central assistance, or  through  the 
centrally sponsored schemes.    Also, the effect of the direct spending by the central 
government on the interregional resources flows is unclear.    
 
As all public expenditure incurred by the Central government cannot be spatially 
partitioned, we need to define the subset of government expenditure that can be 
considered as quasi fiscal transfers and can be partitioned across states. We  identify 
categories of  central  expenditure  having no direct sub-national level incidence  and 
expenditures which  are quasi-fiscal transfers in nature. The subset of government 
expenditures considered in the present study excludes expenditure under  General 
Services, and ‘direction and administration’ and  secretariat services  from all heads of 
expenditure. This we term  as  the  adjusted net expenditure, which is the public 
expenditure residuum. We try to examine its incidence at sub-national levels and define it 
as quasi fiscal transfers. Also in these categories all the expenditure heads could not be 
considered  because of the non availability of data according to the spending across 
states.   
 
Other than the adjusted net expenditure under social and economic services, 
total grant to the states is also a major component of the central expenditure. Grants as a 
percentage of total expenditure of the centre constituted 20.9  percent in 2006-07.  It 
needs to be noted here that due to the multiple channels of transfers, the transfer of 
grants is a complex one  requiring careful analysis. We analyse  this component of the 
central expenditure in detail. Categorising the explicit grants as formula based and non-
formula based transfers, we  also investigate econometrically whether these are fiscal 
equalising or not. The idea behind this classification is that formula based transfers are 
largely driven by the criteria of equity and need.  So this component of the transfers 
should be fiscally equalising even when one is unsure of the effect of the rest of the 
transfers on fiscal equalisation. 
 
                                                 
5 Fiscal inequality has not only persisted, it seems to have aggravated in recent years due to the 
increasing spatial inequality. It is reasonably well established that in post-reform India, regional 
inequality has increased (Alhuwalia: 2002).   9 
To start with, total grants are classified into two broad categories. These are  (i) 
grants given to the states; and  (ii)  grants given under CSS directly to district level 
implementing agencies and local bodies. Again, the grants  given to the states are 
categorised into formula based and non-formula based grants. The formula based grants 
are the sum of statutory grants recommended by the Finance Commission and the plan 
grants under normal central assistance.  The residual is the non-formula based grants, 
largely CSS and plan grants outside the normal central assistance. The direct transfer to 
the districts is  added to the non-formula based grants to  the states to  quantify the 
aggregate amount of non-formula based grants to a state. We have analysed the recent 
phenomenon of direct central government spending via CSS at the district level in detail 
to examine its incidence at the state level and its effect on fiscal equalisation.  
 
In addition to grants, there  is programme-specific direct spending by individual 
ministries/departments of central government at the state level subsumed in the adjusted 
net expenditure under social and economic services. As there is no state-wise data on 
this part of the central spending, the challenge is to partition these expenditures at the 
state level before one examines their nature and impact.   
 
To arrive at the categorisation of aggregate spending at the central government 
level and its state-wise distribution, yet another significant step in the analysis is to comb 
all the  ministries/departments at the aggregate level to examine their importance in 
relation to the aggregate central spending. It is important to note that all the 
ministries/departments do not have significant share in aggregate central budgetary 
spending.  The idea is to select only those  ministries/ departments whose expenditure 
share is high,  and their expenditure functions fall in the overlapping or exclusive 
functional domain of the states.   
 
Therefore,  we  start with an  analysis  of  relative importance of each 
ministries/departments i n terms of expenditure allocation in the aggregate  central 
spending. The threshold minimum expenditure  for the purpose of selection of 
ministries/department for further analysis of theirs expenditure distribution at the state 
level  can be decided  ex-ante ( predetermined as a  thumb rule) or it can also be 
determined ex-post (derived from disaggregated level of expenditure analysis across all 
ministries/departments in terms of its intensity in the aggregate allocation). The latter is 
preferred to former as ex-post categorisation of ministries/departments in terms of their 
significance in spending  is better inferred from the expenditure  data. A comparatively 
better threshold can be arrived at in the iterative procedure of delineating the 
ministries/departments for further analysis.  
 
All  ministries/departments which appear above the threshold minimum 
expenditure  may not be amenable for spatial partitioning. For instance, ministries like 
Finance and Defence may have significant expenditure allocations in the total central 
government expenditure, but  are not relevant to take up for the analysis of inter-state 
distributional impact of  central spending.  The determinants of the majority of these 
categories of expenditure are not necessarily fiscal equalising components of spatial 
need-based requirements. These expenditures are positively related to economic growth 
and in turn can have the spillover effects on all sub-national units, but that is beyond the 
scope of this study. Also they do not fall in the overlapping or exclusive functional domain 
of the states.  This argument has its rubric on the positive externalities of ‘equity and 
efficiency’ arguments of the non-rival and non-excludable public good which supercede 
the spatial dimensions.    10 
 
The following steps are followed in finding out the spatial distribution of central 
expenditure.  
 
a.  To identify the central spending amenable for spatial partitioning.   
b.  Divide the identified central expenditure into four categories:  
 
i.  Direct spending in states via CSS 
ii.  Direct spending at  sub  state level through various CSS not going through 
the state budget 
iii.  Direct programme-specific spending  of each ministries and departments 
including grants and subsidies given to institutions for spending at the state 
level.  
iv.  And  other expenditures residually determined and largely administrative in 
nature.  
 
Above categorisation of central government expenditure is done to examine the 
following specific issues: 
 
1.  Interstate distribution of  central spending, including  direct spending and fiscal 
transfers in the form of grants. 
2.    Programme-specific spending and its distribution across states.  
3.   Selected institution-specific expenditure pattern financed by  central budgetary 
allocation and their statewise distribution. 
4.    Whether the transfers and direct spending individually and in aggregate are 
progressive, or otherwise.   
 
Data for the analysis is derived mainly from the Detailed Demand for Grants 
across  ministries/departments, Expenditure Budget (Volume I and II), Union Budget 
documents, the data posted in individual ministries/department in terms of direct central 
government spending and finance accounts. The analysis pertains to the year 2005-06 
and 2006-07. Before we go into the distribution of direct central expenditure at the state 
level, in the next section, we analyse the nature of explicit fiscal transfers to the states in 
the form of grants through an exploratory data analysis. As mentioned earlier, grants to 
the states is a major component of the central government expenditure and any analysis 
of the central expenditure at the state level would remain incomplete without detailed 
examination of the patterns of grants to the states. In the next section we deal with the 
transfer of grants to the states, which is a part of the explicit central transfers. 
 
 
III. Explicit Fiscal Transfers to the States 
 
 
Explicit fiscal transfers to states consist of tax devolution and grants. Grants 
comprise of finance commission grants, plan grants and grants for central sector 
schemes and centrally sponsored schemes, and special plan schemes for the north-
eastern states. The quantum of vertical transfers in the form of tax sharing and grants as 
a percentage of GDP declined from 4.73 to 3.79 percent during 1990-91 to 1999-00. Tax 
devolution declined mainly due to the tax reforms induced fall in central tax revenues. 
However, the tax devolution to GDP ratio started increasing slowly thereafter and more   11 
sharply from 2004-05. After a steady decline during the 1990s, grants to the states also 
increased sharply from 1999-00 onwards.  
 
In recent years, there has been a major change in the transfer design where in a 
significant amount of the total grants is going directly to the district level implementing 
agencies bypassing the state budget, which we term as the off-budget grants. As evident 
from  Figure 1 , this component of the grant has increased from 0.29  percent to 1.06 
percent of GSDP during 1999-00 to 2006-07. When these off-budget grants are added 
with the budgetary grants given to the states, the transfer of grants show an even sharper 
increase during 1999-00 to 2006-07 and in the year 2006-07, the transfer of grants in 
aggregate was much higher than the tax devolution.   
 
This aggregate quantum of explicit transfers and its movement does not show 
the nature of its distribution across states. We need to examine the nature of this 
distribution across various categories of explicit transfers. As there are several categories 
of explicit transfers having different weights in the total transfers, we thought it would be 
appropriate to divide them in two categories,  viz., formula-based transfers and non-





The formula based transfers  is defined as  the aggregate of tax devolution, 
statutory grants recommended by the Finance Commission and plan grants under normal 
central assistance given to the states under the Gadgil formula. The residual is the non-
formula based transfers to the states.  Presumably, the statutory transfers affected 
through Finance Commissions’ recommendations  and the plan grants under normal 
central assistance  would be progressive as distribution formula of these grants are  by 
and large  equity and need driven.  Non-formula based grants are discretionary and  we 
need to examine how these grants are being distributed across states and also we need 
to look at the net effect of these transfers on fiscal equalisation.  
 
The formula based and non-formula based transfers shown in  Figure 2  reveal 
that relative importance of non-formula based transfers in total transfer  has increased 
sharply in recent years.  The share of formula based transfers in total transfers declined 
sharply from 73  percent in 1990-91 to 66. 3  percent in 2006-07.  In this context it is 
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GDP)   12 
important to examine the state specific distribution of formula and non-formula based 
transfer in per-capita term.  
 
Figure 2: Relative Importance of Formula and Non-Formula Based 




































Formula Non-Formula Off-Budget Grants
 
 
As evident from Table 1, the major component of formula based transfers is tax 
devolution and in per-capita term, the tax devolution to low income states is much higher 
than the high and middle income states.  The other component of  the formula based 
transfers is the plan grants under the normal central assistance distributed under the 
Gadgil formula. In case of distribution of formula based plan grants also one observes 
that in per-capita terms, the transfer is much higher to many low income states vis-à-vis 
high income states. However, there are exceptions. The per-capita grant to Bihar is lower 
than the all-state average per-capita.  It is important to note that many of the high and 
middle income states get higher per-capita formula based grant when compared with 
some of the low income states. Unlike tax devolution, the distribution of  formula based 
grant across states is not as progressive. From the slope of the trend line fitted through 
the scatter plot of per-capita tax devolution and formula based grants vis-à-vis state level 
per-capita income it appears that per-capita tax devolution is more progressive than the 
formula based grants. This has also been proved in our econometric exercise ( Section 
V). 
   13 
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Table 1: Formula and Non-Formula Based Transfers: Per-capita State wise – 2006-07  
(in Rs.) 
 
  Formula Based 
Transfers 
Non-Formula Based Transfers 
























1070.8  284.5  44.1  141.3  134.8  290.0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
1091.6  333.0  21.0  161.3  96.1  306.0 
Bihar  1450.6  242.6  40.5  106.3  183.3  324.1 
Chattisgarh  1403.2  283.3  178.6  173.3  135.6  661.9 
Goa  1963.0  201.2  140.5  91.6  123.2  95.3 
Gujarat  797.9  274.7  42.1  107.7  145.7  159.2 
Haryana  549.7  235.1  34.5  158.2  55.0  220.6 
Jharkhand  1370.1  188.8  142.9  164.2  18.1  451.0 
Karnataka  948.7  200.2  39.0  222.7  387.8  297.9 
Kerala  951.3  342.5  22.1  104.4  151.6  116.3 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
1205.6  341.2  68.8  216.1  40.7  568.6 
Maharashtra  569.6  365.4  16.0  100.1  327.6  178.3 
Orissa  1585.1  314.1  59.3  185.0  246.6  454.4 
Punjab  580.2  160.4  33.6  123.7  512.4  122.9 
Rajasthan  1073.9  255.5  47.6  221.5  77.9  432.8 
Tamil nadu  977.1  317.0  73.9  95.8  21.5  189.8 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
1252.8  252.8  35.0  116.9  18.9  249.6 
West Bengal  991.7  317.1  20.2  128.2  45.1  211.1 
Special 
Category 
1375.6  2861.1  169.3  421.4  895.5  616.7 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
2946.9  10886.4  1236.4  2717.9  1030.4  2599.3 
Assam  1349.3  1114.5  128.4  249.3  39.2  620.9 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
933.2  2066.8  132.9  470.6  3578.3  548.7 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
1213.2  5128.8  3.9  458.2  395.0  517.3 
Manipur  1698.4  7327.9  224.4  579.3  135.4  396.7 
Meghalaya  1797.3  2226.5  292.6  428.7  1899.0  731.6 
Mizoram  2813.0  11245.5  780.0  1649.9  776.8  1486.2 
Nagaland  1219.4  3094.6  644.3  806.8  4093.8  452.5 
Sikkim  4595.6  7401.8  607.2  1739.8  1096.6  984.3 
Tripura  1502.9  5987.9  257.1  550.9  141.9  677.4 
Uttaranchal  1216.4  1513.1  86.5  163.9  1547.5  461.2 
      Source (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of the Respective States 
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III.a. Changing Pattern of Plan Assistance to the States 
 
 
While analysing the explicit fiscal transfers, it is critical to examine closely the 
changing nature of plan assistance to the states. It is hardly noticed that within the plan 
assistance, the share of normal central assistance through Gadgil formula is coming 
down and the share of the rest is on the increase.
6 As plan assistance outside normal 
central assistance is not formula based, and one does not have a clear idea of the nature 
of distribution of these grants. Thus, our objective is two fold:  
 
i.  a closer examination of  the pattern of  the quantum of normal central 
assistance in recent years 
ii.  to analyse how the rest of the central plan assistance is distributed to the 
states and its nature.  
iii.   
 
 
As evident from  Figure 5 ,  when we look at,  the share of normal central 
assistance to the states in total plan assistance has declined to 27.5 percent in 2006-07. 
This was 42.4 percent in 2000-01.  The estimates of plan assistance outside the normal 
central assistance  show an erratic pattern in the per-capita  state wise distribution.  It 
needs to be noted that the plan assistance reported in Table 2 is cumulative one and is 
not comparable with the figures given in Table 1. As evident from Table 2, Goa received 
largest per-capita transfers in some years. Maharashtra received lowest per capita plan 
transfers outside normal assistance in the year 2004-05 and 2005-06, though a quantum 
increase in the transfers is noted for 2006-07 and 2007-08 (Table 2). The per-capita plan 
assistance outside the normal central assistance when plotted against per-capita state 
income, appears to have a negative relationship indicating some degree of progressivity. 




                                                 
6 The major components of the rest of the Plan Assistance comprise of Special Plan Assistance, 
Special Central Assistance, Additional Central Assistance for Externally Aided Projects and other 
grants for specific projects under the state plan. 
Figure 5: Structure of Plan Assistance to the States: 2000-01 to 2007-08 
42.4  45.5  42.2  42.3  43.2  47.1 
31.8  27.5 
54.5  57.8  57.7  56.8  52.9 
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Table 2:  Cumulative Per Capita Plan Transfers Outside Normal Assistance  
  (in Rs.) 
 
   2004 - 05  2005-06  2006-07  2007-08 
General Category States  110.2  83.6  123.9  201.0 
Andhra Pradesh  106.0  117.3  222.7  335.8 
Bihar  91.8  95.8  162.3  168.0 
Chhattisgarh  92.2  69.7  158.3  194.1 
Goa  333.2  35.7  49.7  253.0 
Gujarat  95.5  165.5  136.1  310.1 
Haryana  46.6  21.6  60.0  85.1 
Jharkhand  91.3  74.4  46.2  83.6 
Karnataka  105.0  101.4  149.4  213.4 
Kerala  133.8  79.5  113.2  196.7 
Madhya Pradesh  108.9  92.9  140.3  226.6 
Maharashtra  67.3  60.4  179.0  267.1 
Orissa  246.8  166.6  187.4  326.4 
Punjab  32.8  65.8  85.5  147.7 
Rajasthan  104.9  66.2  86.1  131.2 
Tamilnadu  67.5  43.4  139.6  246.9 
Uttar Pradesh  54.2  44.6  58.5  62.1 
West Bengal  94.5  121.1  132.5  169.4 
Special Category  1163.8  859.2  970.1  1773.5 
Arunachal Pradesh  978.7  1052.9  1513.1  4514.8 
Assam  328.7  365.8  302.2  361.6 
Himachal Pradesh  940.5  812.7  860.7  1397.6 
Jammu And Kashmir  1578.8  1524.4  2107.5  2644.4 
Manipur  1535.3  1922.7  1841.1  3444.7 
Meghalaya  639.1  315.7  462.0  613.2 
Mizoram  2173.8  1243.0  1135.8  2750.8 
Nagaland  720.5  667.6  618.0  814.0 
Sikkim  2472.7  841.1  912.1  1720.9 
Tripura  666.6  384.0  493.9  555.4 
Uttarakhand  767.3  321.0  424.4  691.0 
       Source: http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/dea.html 
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III.b. Transfers by-Passing the State Budget  
 
The other major component of non-formula based transfer from the centre is 
direct transfer to districts and other implementing agencies by-passing the state budget. 
As evident from the table, this is a new development in the design of transfers in India. As 
per the budget estimates 2007-08, the aggregate resource flow from the centre to the 
states, constituted more than 7.26  percent of GDP; resources that are going directly to 
districts and other implementing agencies amounted to 1.22  percent of GDP. This is 
higher than any other components of grants transfers and constituted 37.5 and 34.8 
percent of tax devolution to the states in the year 2006-07 and 2007-08 respectively.  It is 
important to examine what constitutes these flows.  
 
As evident from Table 3, around 93 percent of this flow is through three central 
ministries, viz. Ministry of Rural Development (55 percent), Ministry of Human Resource 
Development (29 percent) and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (11 percent). Out of 
this, transfers on account of  Sarva Siksha A bhiyan and  NREGA together constituted 
almost half of the total. Of the total centrally sponsored schemes to districts,  the 
ministries of rural development, health, human resources and agriculture constitutes 
around 98  percent In particular, Ministry of Rural Development constitute the single 
largest share of CSS to districts; with little  more than half percent of total. So we 
concentrate on statewise district level spending in these three ministries which captures 
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Table 3: Central Level Transfers to Districts/Implementing Agencies: 
Ministry Wise Distribution 
 
  Share in Total 
Ministry/ Department  2006-07  2007-08(RE)
Agriculture  3.82  4.57 
Health and Family Welfare  10.73  11.40 
Of which NRHM  7.98  8.39 
Human Resources  28.45  28.01 
Of which SSA  24.85  23.45 
Rural Development  55.18  53.69 
Of which NREGA/SGRY/IAY/PMGSY/SGSY  47.19  41.01 
Chemicals and Fertilisers   Nil  Nil 
Shipping and Road Transport  Nil  Nil 
Consumer Affairs, Food & Civil Supplies  Nil   
Other Ministries     
Tourism  0.04  0.10 
Commerce and Industry  1.01  1.11 
Environment and Forests  0.67  0.77 
Women and Child Development  0.00  Nil 
New and Renewable Energy  0.09   
Total  100.00  100.00 
            Source: Union Budget Documents, 2008-09 
 
The inter-state pattern of district transfers reveals that in per capita terms, 
Chattisgarh received highest level of transfers at Rs 662 followed by Madhya Pradesh at 
Rs  569 and Jharkhand at Rs 4 51  for the year 2006-07 ( Table 4 ). The  states which 
receive the district level CSS above the all state average were Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, 
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Andhra Pradesh  51.72  58.53  65.85  67.38  113.33  174.97  305.97 
Bihar  36.45  54.62  38.90  70.26  211.30  205.62  324.08 
Chhattisgarh  47.72  85.20  92.71  110.52  193.94  282.54  661.94 
Goa  68.25  71.01  12.48  22.64  26.47  92.94  95.30 
Gujarat  41.28  44.88  60.00  66.41  84.36  125.96  159.25 
Haryana  39.21  52.09  52.31  73.66  112.53  121.38  220.65 
Jharkhand  69.38  105.65  70.79  153.46  196.69  291.17  451.03 
Karnataka  39.04  68.59  77.51  80.48  118.59  171.77  297.94 
Kerala  29.34  45.16  28.41  49.90  80.17  94.33  116.26 
Madhya Pradesh  55.91  78.15  81.38  124.37  154.15  239.91  568.57 
Maharashtra  33.58  61.96  41.89  62.15  98.22  155.46  178.33 
Orissa  80.87  97.24  90.80  126.13  186.41  283.78  454.44 
Punjab  14.88  42.29  37.14  48.18  45.85  109.59  122.88 
Rajasthan  68.24  69.81  90.52  78.23  129.94  262.02  432.79 
Tamilnadu  41.94  58.43  67.81  71.68  119.16  149.00  189.80 
Uttar Pradesh  25.98  36.79  24.76  33.90  89.16  206.62  249.56 
West Bengal  30.71  44.23  35.44  53.18  115.66  133.62  211.12 
Max/MIN ratio  5.44  2.87  7.43  6.78  7.98  3.13  6.95 
CV  0.39  0.31  0.44  0.45  0.43  0.38  0.56 
             Source: From respective ministries  
 
The data from Table 4  indicates that the per capita district level transfers have 
increased sharply over the years. However, the distribution of states in transfer per-capita 
did not change much. During the period, the  states above the per capita district level 
remained the same, however with the upper bound outliers of states with more than Rs 
500 from one  state (Chattisgarh) in 2006-07 to two  states (Chattisgarh and Madhya 
Pradesh) in 2007-08. Similarly, the  states that lie below the  state average per capita 
transfers remained the same with change in one of the states in the category of lower 
bound outlier states; being Goa and Kerala in 2006-07 and Goa and Punjab in 2007-08 
(Table 5). The scatter plot of per-capita income and the district level transfers shows that 
transfers to low income states are much higher than high income states and the trend line 
fitted on the scatter sloped downward.    20 









































Table 5: Categorisation of States above/below State Average District level Transfers 
States  2005-06  2006-07 
Above  State Average 
     
Category I 
 (500>x> 900) 
 
Chattisgarh  Chattisgarh,Madhya Pradesh 
 
Category II 
(State Avg > x>500) 




Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, 
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa, Rajasthan 
Below State Average 







Punjab, Tamil nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal 
Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, 
Karnataka, Maharasthra, 





Goa, Kerala  Goa, Punjab 
          Source: (Basic data): Respective Ministries.  
 
The distribution of these transfers is largely progressive ( Table 5 ) as per capita 
transfers to low-income states have been several fold higher than the middle and high 
income states.  Though these transfers have the inherent problem of central discretions, 
both with regard to the allocation and quantum, the data reveals a positive discretion in 
favour of the low-income states.  But the larger question is whether these transfers can 
be justified on the ground of progressivity bypassing the authority of the state! If the 
authority of the states is bypassed on the functions that are in their domain, the 
accountability will be lost.  As mentioned by Rao (2007, p. 1253), these kind of transfers 
have been “undermining the role of systems and institutions in the transfer system.  In 
fact, even under the transfers for state plans, normal assistance, which is given according 
to the Gadgil formula, constituted less than 48 percent. Thus, we have a situation where 
the grants system has become predominantly purpose specific with a cobweb of 
conditionalities specified by various central ministries. Furthermore, quite a considerable   21 
proportion of grants which used to be given to the states now directly goes to 
autonomous agencies. This raises questions about the capacity to deliver public services 
by these autonomous agencies, mechanisms to augment the capacity and as the funds 
do not pass through states’ consolidated funds, of accountability.” 
 
Regarding the allocation of these funds, an element of uncertainty continues. 
Since these tendencies have increased over time and states are also accepting these 
deviations from what the Constitution of India has envisaged without resistance, central 
intervention on state subject would continue to grow.  N. C. Saxena, as member of the 
National Advisory Council in an insightful paper on CSS, observed that “GoI has 
increased its control over the state sector in three ways, firstly through substantial funding 
of CSS, the budget for which is about 60 percent of the Central Assistance; secondly 
much of it goes straight to the districts, thus bypassing the States and placing district 
bureaucracy directly under the supervision of the GoI; and thirdly more than half of 
Central Assistance is given in the form of ACA, which is often not formula based but 
where the GoI Ministries have a great deal of control over the State allocations and 
releases.” 
 
IV.  Distribution of Central Expenditure to States 
 
 
  When we talk about incidence of central government expenditure on states, the 
first step is to delineate the expenditure that does not have any impact at sub-national 
levels and those which cannot be spatially distributed. As mentioned earlier, expenditure 
items excluded are general service expenditure, expenditure on secretariat services, and 
direction and administration from all the categories of services. The estimates arrived at 
after netting out the various expenditures work out to be 16.04 percent of GDP (Table 6). 
Within the adjusted  central government expenditure, general services constitutes the 
single most larger component at 7.15  percent of GDP; closely followed by social and 
economic services at 5.53  percent of GDP for the year 2006-07 and grants-in-aid to 
states at 3.06 percent of GDP. Out of the total grants, 1.06  percent flows directly to the 
districts bypassing the state budget.   
 
Table 6: Adjusted Central Government Expenditure 
 




Total Expenditure Net of Adjustments  16.04 
General Services  7.15 
Social and Economic Services  5.53 
Grants-in-Aid  3.36 
Through Consolidated Funds of States  2.30 
Directly to the Districts  1.06 
Adjusted Items   1.28 
Source: Union Budget documents, 2008-09 
 
The distribution of central spending across ministries/ departments reveals that 
only 10 ministries/departments out of 53 have budgetary allocations above 1 percent of   22 
the total allocations. The point further to note is that only 4 ministries/departments have 
allocation higher than 5  percent of the aggregate budgetary allocation. The Ministry of 
Finance is the  only Ministry which has allocation  as high as 41 percent (Table 7) of the 
total allocation.  The 43  ministries/departments with less than 1  percent  of total 
expenditure are taken out of the analysis. This is done for the purpose of manageability 
and also due to their relative insignificance in total spending. 
 














Aggregate share in 
total spending 
 
0 to =0.1  5125.26  13  0.68 
=0.1 to = 0.5  29736.82  18  3.96 
=0.5 to = 1.0  63615.84  12  8.47 
=1.0 to = 5.0  141962.91  6  18.91 
=5.0 to =20.0  204667.55  3  27.26 
=20.0   305774.66  1  40.72 
Total  750883.04  53  100 
           Source: Union Budget Document: 2008-09 
 
Within the  ministries/departments which have allocations above one  percent of 
the total budget, we take out Finance and Defence and  Home, though they have 
significant budgetary allocations (Table 8). Most of the Finance Ministry expenditures are 
transfers to states and defence and home are part of the general services expenditures. 
So for the purpose of our spatial distribution of central expenditures across states, we 
focus on Ministry of    Agriculture (1.93  percent), Health and Family Welfare (2.41 
percent), Shipping, Road Transport and Highways (2.47  percent), Chemicals and 
Fertilisers (4.2  percent), Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution (4.4  percent), 

















   23 
Table 8: Ministry-wise Allocation and their Distribution: 2008-09 
 
Ministry  Allocation 
(In Rs. crore) 
Percentage 
Distribution 
Agriculture  14476.88 1.93
Health and Family Welfare  18123.00 2.41
Shipping, Road Transport and Highways  18549.89 2.47
Home Affairs  25923.18 3.45
Chemicals & Fertilisers  31547.00 4.20
Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution  33342.95 4.44
Human Resource Development  38702.87 5.15
Rural Development  42429.86 5.65
Defence  123534.82 16.45
Finance  305774.66 40.72
Other Ministries   98477.92 13.11
Total  750883.04 100.00
Source: Union Budget Document: 2008-09 
 
After identifying these seven ministries for detailed analysis, we have analysed 
their Detailed Demand for Grants (hereafter DDG) for the year 2006-07, to examine the 
nature of their spending and to devise a method to see in what way their spending can be 
portioned across states. We have reclassified the DDG of each of the ministries into four 
broad categories:  
 
a.  Transfers to states via CSS 
b.  Direct CSS transfers to districts 
c.  Grants, subsides and contribution and programme specific spending other than 
CSS 
d.  Other expenditures  
 
Table 9  shows that  taking all these Ministries together,  the CSS explains 40 
percent of their total expenditure.    In other words, t he estimates r eveal  upfront that 
distribution of CSS explains a major chunk of the total expenditure of these Ministries and 
their statewise distribution is already discussed in the last section. But our objective is to 
look into the  direct expenditure and its distribution across states. So we concentrate on 
the rest of the expenditure and within that we exclude the other expenditure category, 
which is largely administrative in nature. The  residual expenditure is 55.08  percent and 
3.92  percent  respectively for programme  specific spending and  administrative 
expenditure.  
 
The  disaggregated  estimates  across  ministries  reveal that the direct CSS 
transfers to below state level is as high as 84 percent of the total allocation in Ministry of 
Rural Development; 39.62 percent in the Ministry of Health; and 47.10 in case of Human 
Resources. While in case of grants, subsidies and programme specific spending, the 
spending is as high as 99 percent in case of Consumer Affairs, Food and Civil Supplies 
and Chemicals and Fertilisers, which needs further investigation; and in case of Shipping   24 
and  Road  Transport, it is 71.80  percent.  The administrative expenditure is relatively 
insignificant with less than one percent of the total; except for Agriculture (15.75 percent), 
Health (20.50 percent) and Shipping and Road Transport (9.74 percent).  
 






















Agriculture   100 16.60 17.94 49.70 15.75
Health   100 21.98 39.62 17.90 20.50
Human Resources   100 18.69 47.10 33.58 0.63
Consumer Affairs, Food 
&Civil Supplies 
100 0.25 0.00 99.18 0.57
Rural Development  100 10.74 83.57 5.03 0.66
Chemicals and Fertilisers  100 0.00 0.00 99.90 0.10
Shipping and Road 
Transport 
100 18.46 0.00 71.80 9.74
Total: All Ministries  100 10.09 30.91 55.08 3.92
           Source: Detailed Demand for Grants of respective ministries 2008-09 
 
As our focus now is on the state specific spending under the category “Grants, 
Subsides and Contribution and Programme Specific Spending other than CSS”, the 
category of direct spending, we first examine the major broad heads of expenditure in this 
category. As evident from Table 10, the Ministry of Agriculture spends directly on crop 
insurance (15  percent), gives grants to NAFED (13.3) for agricultural marketing 
operation, Agricultural Research Institutes and PUSA (53.5  percent) and other 
expenditures (18 percent).  
 
Among all the ministries, the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers spends 36.52 
percent of the total programme specific spending by seven  ministries. The Ministry of 
Food and Consumer Affairs constitutes the second major chunk of the expenditure; with 
31.33 percent of the aggregate spending by the selected seven ministries/departments. 
Within Food and Consumer Affairs, subsidy to FCI food grains constitutes 86 percent of 
total; followed by subsidy to states on decentralised procurement of  food grains at 12.6 
percent.  The third  largest ministry is that of Shipping and Surface Transport at 11.59 
percent of the total spending of these seven  ministries. Within the Ministry of Shipping 
and Surface Transport, the Central Road Fund constitutes 90.71 percent (Table 10).  The 
Human Resource Development Ministry’s spending in total programme specific spending 
is  10.31  percent.  Within MoHRD,  Kendriya Vidyalayas and  Navodaya Vidyalayas 
constitute 21.54 percent of total MoHRD programme specific spending allocation; while 
distribution of spending on central universities is at 18.33 percent, UGC at 16.61 percent, 
IITs at 13.85 percent. IISC, AICTE and IIMs each constituting around 1 percent only of 
the total. The Health Ministry spends around 2.75 percent of the total programme specific 
spending by three ministries. Within the Health Ministry, grants under NRHM are the 
highest (26.2 percent), ICMR (18.5 percent) and NACO (13.4 percent).   25 
 
Table 10 : Various Programme Specific Spending by Ministries 







Ministry/Department  2006-07     
I. Agriculture 
Crop Insurance  634.4  15.0  0.82 
NAFED  560.0  13.3  0.73 
Agriculture Research Institutes 
at states and PUSA  2259.2  53.5  2.93 
Others  768.0  18.2  1.00 
Total   4221.6  100.0  5.47 
II. Human Resource Development 
Central Universities  1458.1  18.3  1.89 
UGC  1321.3  16.6  1.71 
Kendriya Vidayalas & 
Navodaya Vidyalayas  1713.0  21.5  2.22 
IIsc Bangalore  155.0  2.0  0.20 
IITs  1101.5  13.9  1.43 
AICTE  91.4  1.2  0.12 
IIMs  69.5  0.9  0.09 
Others  2043.3  25.7  2.65 
Total  7953.0  100.0  10.31 
III. Rural Development 
FCI for Food Grains  1368.4  87.9  1.77 
Others  189.2  12.1  0.25 
Total  1557.6  100.0  2.02 
IV. Shipping and Surface Transport 
Central Road Fund  8113.5  90.7  10.52 
Calcutta Port Trust Subsidy  341.8  3.8  0.44 
Inland Waterways Authority  114.3  1.3  0.15 
Border Roads Bhutan Comp 
Allowance  93.7  1.1  0.12 
Cochin Shipyard  70.0  0.8  0.09 
Hindustan Shipyard  40.5  0.5  0.05 
Hoogly Port Trust Subsidy  32.9  0.4  0.04 
Others  137.5  1.5  0.18 
Total   8944.2  100.0  11.59 
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Table 10: Various Programme Specific Spending by Ministries (contd.) 







V. Food and Consumer Affairs 
Subsidy FCI food grains  20786.2  86.0  26.95 
STATES on Decentralised 
procurement food grains  3041.4  12.6  3.94 
Others  340.6  1.4  0.44 
Total  24168.2  100.0  31.33 
VI. Ministry of Health and Family welfare 
Grants-in-Aid Under NRHM  556.2  26.2  0.72 
All India Institute of Medical 
Sciences  457.3 
21.5 
0.59 
Indian Council of Medical 
Research  394.0 
18.5 
0.51 
States Aids Control Societies 
under NACO  283.9 
13.4 
0.37 
PG Inst of Medical Research 
Chandigarh  231.0 
10.9 
0.30 
Total  2124.3  100.0  2.75 
 VII. Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers 
Subsidies Nitrogenous  11910.4  42.3  15.44 
Subsidies Indegenous 
Controlled fertilisers 
6648.2  23.6 
8.62 
Imported fertilisers  5071.1  18.0  6.57 
Subsidies Imported Controlled 
fert 
3649.9  13.0 
4.73 
Fertiliser Freight Subsidy  740.0  2.6  0.96 
Other Grants  151.0  0.5  0.20 
Total   28170.5  100.0  36.52 
Grand Total 
(I+II+III+IV+V+VI+VII)  77139.4    100.00 
Source: Detailed Demand for Grants for Various Ministries 2008-09 
 
Having identified these spending categories, we have collected information on 
programme specific spending on states from the Ministry of Agriculture, Human Resource 
Development, Food and Consumer Affairs and Shipping and Surface Transport. We also 
have collected information from  Fertiliser Association of India to collect state wise 
distribution of fertiliser s ubsidy.  Also we have collected information from Agricultural 
Insurance Corporation on state wise disbursement of claims of agricultural insurance, 
from NAFED on agricultural marketing operation, and from UGC on grants to the states 
for universities and colleges. Having obtained the specific information we have arrived at 
the distribution of direct spending in the specific programmes by respective ministries in 
each state.  
 
The pattern of these spending is given in Table 11. As evident from the Table 11, 
the bulk of the expenditure is on petroleum subsidy, followed by fertiliser and food. The 
other spending are much less in per capita term in three categories, viz., Agricultural   27 
Marketing and Insurance, Central Road Fund and School and Higher Education. The per-
capita distribution of this expenditure reveals highly regressive pattern ( see, Figure  8).  
We have also specifically looked into the pattern of three major subsidies, viz., food, 
petroleum and fertilisers across states for the year 2006-07 and 2007-08. It is observed 
that there has been a significant increase in these three major subsides in absolute 
volume as well as in per-capita terms and the pattern of their distribution across states 
continues to be regressive. 
 




















General Category States  450.25  170.11  243.47  11.52  12.83  25.65  913.84 
Andhra Pradesh  489.01  276.17  361.93  25.13  5.80  24.34  1182.37 
Bihar  226.82  68.22  149.45  8.32  2.50  10.18  465.49 
Chattisgarh  335.58  291.00  245.87  0.38  9.97  14.81  897.62 
Goa  1646.55  52.20  60.69  0.00  0.00  50.28  1809.72 
Gujarat  632.93  79.08  294.58  16.32  17.41  13.09  1053.42 
 Haryana  867.49  59.02  610.53  52.70  24.00  26.14  1639.88 
Jharkhand  320.80  145.23  55.11  17.97  3.47  14.56  557.13 
Karnataka  550.83  248.73  297.86  2.35  19.21  16.94  1135.91 
Kerala  520.09  199.83  69.85  0.55  9.16  27.18  826.67 
Madhya Pradesh  334.12  141.45  211.54  4.66  12.11  36.41  740.28 
Maharashtra  623.71  141.82  243.92  2.13  20.33  21.93  1053.84 
Orissa  339.81  288.18  129.31  0.61  12.90  22.82  793.63 
Punjab  842.46  18.38  791.04  0.54  23.09  39.45  1714.97 
Rajasthan  429.15  61.71  177.21  73.46  21.31  21.81  784.66 
Tamil nadu  624.63  396.61  194.25  7.60  19.67  31.64  1274.40 
Uttar Pradesh  317.99  149.26  245.96  1.34  10.42  37.46  762.44 
West Bengal  350.84  185.78  183.13  3.82  7.80  28.67  760.04 
Special Category  435.57  294.70  75.63  0.13  15.66  74.99  896.68 
Arunachal Pradesh  506.37  298.45  3.15  0.00  87.69  136.58  1032.25 
Assam  332.41  304.67  55.71  0.05  6.44  53.27  752.55 
Himachal Pradesh  553.30  319.99  83.48  0.00  18.04  57.29  1032.09 
Jammu & Kashmir  556.60  329.34  89.75  0.00  26.46  45.92  1048.07 
Manipur  310.34  177.62  75.42  0.00  12.53  149.22  725.13 
Meghalaya  577.65  270.74  20.23  0.00  22.15  283.34  1174.10 
Mizoram  478.72  392.61  10.59  0.00  39.65  448.13  1369.70 
Nagaland  228.75  330.85  0.22  0.00  11.04  107.60  678.47 
Sikkim  702.40  439.08  0.00  0.00  24.23  31.40  1197.11 
Tripura  320.43  382.32  51.39  0.32  8.51  41.38  804.36 
Uttaranchal  585.31  177.99  180.07  0.72  19.84  72.65  1036.58 
Source (Basic Data): 1. Fertiliser Statistics 2008, Fertiliser of Association of India, New Delhi, 2. Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas, Government of India, 3. Annual  Report 2008, University Grants Commission, New Delhi, 4. NAFED and 
Agricultural Insurance Corporation, Government of India   28 












































V.  Econometric Investigation 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, in our approach, we further subdivide the total transfer into 
‘formula-based’ and ‘non formula-based’ transfers. The first category includes tax 
devolution, statutory grants from the Finance Commission and state plan grants as per 
the Gadgil formula. The second category is the residual which includes other state plan 
grants, Central plan scheme grants, centrally sponsored scheme (CSS) and special plan 
scheme grants. All these are routed via the state budget, and therefore reflected in the 
finance  accounts of the respective state governments.  The resources going to the 
implementing agencies directly at the state and the district level are also added to the 
non-formula grants.   
 
Apart from central transfers through state budgets and direct spending at the 
district level going outside it, we look at other expenditure incurred by the  centre but 
which can be in the domain of the states. We call this group of transfers as ‘quasi-fiscal 
transfers’ (QFT). The main constituents of QFT are subsidies for food, fertiliser and fuel, 
procurement by NAFED from states, crop insurance, central road fund and spending by 
UGC in each state.  The major distinguishing feature of QFT is that it is non formula-
based, and the expenditure incidence in a state is dependent on many factors which may 
not be purely based on the principles of equity as in the case of formula based transfers. 
 
 For the purpose of our econometric exercise, we obtained data on all the 
categories for two years – 2005-06 and 2006-07. The statewise distribution of the various 
transfers is discussed in Section III and Section IV. Using this dataset, we undertake a 
preliminary econometric exercise to examine whether the variation in transfers across 
states can be explained by differences in per capita GSDP proxied for fiscal capacity of 
individual states. Since these are all different modes of transfers following the horizontal 
equity principle, we set up the null hypothesis of no relation between the transfers 
(dependent) and per capita GSDP.  We normalise by taking log of the variables and pool 
the data for two years for which it is available. The regressions are run without any state 
or year dummies in order to see the unconstrained estimates of the explanatory   29 
variables.  In Table 1 2, we present the results for the pooled estimates using log of per 
capita GSDP as the explanatory variable. We run the regressions using constant but do 
not report the results here. 
  
Table 12: Regressions using Per Capita GSDP 
Explanatory Variable: log Per 
Capita GSDP 
  
Coefficient  p-value  Adj. 
R-squared 
Tax Devolution  -0.588  0.000  0.42 
Tax Devolution + Formula Grants  -0.514  0.000  0.37 
Non-formula Grants  0.111  0.521  0.01 
Quasi Fiscal Transfers  0.652  0.000  0.71 
Non-formula Grants + QFT  0.408  0.000  0.30 
 
We divide the transfers into three basic categories: (i) Tax devolution, (ii) 
Formula based grants (block grants and Finance Commission non-plan grants), (iii) non 
formula based grants constituting centrally sponsored schemes, non formula plan grants 
and direct transfer to districts that go outside the state budget, and (iv) quasi-fiscal 
transfers that are expenditure carried out by the central government directly in the states, 
including subsidies o n food, fuel and fertiliser, agricultural crop insurance, central road 
fund, UGC grants.  
 
The regression results indicate a very different picture for formula based and non 
formula based transfers. Tax devolution singly and in conjunction with other formula 
grants are equalising, with per capita GSDP explaining nearly 40 percent of the variations 
across states in both cases.  
 
On the other hand, the rest of the transfers that are provided to states on the 
basis of demand with considerable discretion on the part of the centre are not equalising 
in nature. Quasi fiscal transfers and total non formula grants (including QFT) are both 
positive and significant vis-à-vis per capita GSDP.  
 
 
Table 13: Regressions using Time Dummy 








Tax Devolution  -0.626  0.000  0.278  0.000  0.54 
Tax Devolution + 
Formula Grants  -0.552  0.000  0.279  0.003  0.52 
Non-formula Grants  0.056  0.713  0.402  0.005  0.20 
Quasi Fiscal 
Transfers  0.646  0.000  0.051  0.438  0.70 
Non-formula Grants 
+ QFT  0.377  0.001  0.226  0.011  0.43 
 
        To check whether the transfers have changed significantly in the two years, we 
use a time dummy for 2006-07 and regress the transfers on both per capita GSDP and 
the dummy variable. Interestingly, we find that the latter is significant in all regression 
except for QFT. This also indicates a structural impact of the introduction of VAT and the   30 
launching of  various flagship programme and a quantum jump in the transfers going  via 
the non-formula route, which had an impact on both the formula and non formula based 
transfers. The fit of the regressions improve significantly in all the cases, especially for 
non formula and total transfers. Moreover, the coefficient of total transfer is now weakly 
significant at 10 percent level, with more than one-third of the variations explained by per 
capita GSDP and the differences in the two years in the data. 
 
 
VI.  Policy Conclusions 
 
 
On the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the transfer system 
has undergone significant changes over the years, with an overwhelming influence of 
the transfers going outside the statutory channels. The effect of these changes through 
multiple channels of transfers is mixed in achieving horizontal equity and it appears that 
one is in conflict with the other. Our econometric result on this seems robust as this has 
been corroborated by the exploratory data analysis.  On top of that when we add the 
direct central spending in the states  through its own programme in seven selected 
ministries, the net effect becomes  highly regressive.    To conclude, it should be 
emphasised that any design of transfers in the context of in Indian federation would 
remain cosmetic, unless drastic redistribution takes place in the horizontal allocation of 




Ahluwalia, Montek S, 2002. ‘State-Level Performance under Economic Reforms in India’ 
in (ed.) Krueger, Anne O Economic Policy Reforms and the Indian Economy. New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bagchi, Amaresh 2003. Fifty Years of Fiscal Federalism in India: An Appraisal, Working 
Paper 2, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. 
 
Bagchi Amaresh  and Pinaki Chakraborty, 2004. “Towards a Rational System of Centre 
State Revenue Transfers”, Economic and Political Weekly, XXXIX (26); 2737-2747. 
 
Lanjouw, Peter and Martin  Ravallion, 1998. "Benefit incidence and the 
timing of program capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1956, The 
World Bank. 
 
Rao, M Govinda, 1997.  “Invisible Transfers in Indian Federalism”,  Public 
Finance/Finances Publiques, 52(3-4); 429-448. 
 
Rao, M. Govinda and Nirvikar Singh, 2005. Political Economy of Federalism in India. New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
 
Rao, M. Govinda 2007. “Fiscal Adjustment: Rhetoric and Reality”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 42(14);1252-1257. April 07 - April 13. 
 
Saxena Naresh C.:  Central Transfers to States & Centrally Sponsored Schemes, 
http://nac.nic.in/concept%20papers/Central%20Transfers.pdf 
 
  